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Abstract. Richard Goldschmidt was one of the most controversial biologists of the
mid-twentieth century. Rather than fade from view, Goldschmidt’s work and reputation
has persisted in the biological community long after he has. Goldschmidt’s longevity is
due in large part to how he was represented by Stephen J. Gould. When viewed from the
perspective of the biographer, Gould’s revival of Goldschmidt as an evolutionary
heretic in the 1970s and 1980s represents a selective reinvention of Goldschmidt that
provides a contrast to other kinds of biographical commemorations by scientists.
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Richard Goldschmidt is one of the most controversial and enigmatic
figures in twentieth century biology. During a career that stretched from
1900 to 1958, Goldschmidt became known as one of the top biologists
in the world by producing groundbreaking studies of sex determination,
gene action, evolution, and geographic variation. After he was forced to
leave Nazi Germany in 1936, however, he also produced incredibly
controversial theories denying both the existence of the gene and the
possibility of gradual evolution of new species (Dietrich, 1995, 2003;
Richmond, 1986). Like most scientists and their work, Goldschmidt
faded from the scene after his death in 1958. Citations to The Material
Basis of Evolution fell to zero in 1968 (see Figure 1). Citations after 1975
suggest a different story. Rather than fade into obscurity after his death,
Goldschmidt’s work and reputation have persisted, even flourished, in
the last half of the twentieth century. Taking their cues from his con-
temporary opponents, prominent biologists in the last 30 years have
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reinforced and reinvented Goldschmidt’s reputation as a biological
heretic (Bush, 1982; Gould, 1982a). Indeed, adopting the label of
‘‘Goldschmidtian’’ was a crucial aspect of Stephen Jay Gould’s strategy
for advocating the novelty of his own theory of punctuated equilibrium
in the 1980s (Gould, 1982b, 2002). Scientific Creationists have likewise
rallied around Goldschmidt’s heretical reputation as evidence for an
oppressive evolutionary orthodoxy (‘‘Monster Mutation Theory’’,
2010). In the last 10 years, as evolutionary developmental biology has
experienced a resurgence, Goldschmidt’s reputation and even his theo-
ries of ‘‘hopeful monsters’’ have become a common gauntlet thrown
down as a rhetorical flourish, a scientific challenge, and a signifier of
non-conformity (Ronshaugen et al., 2002).
Where traditional biographies center the life of a person, I would like
to consider how reputation and its uses extend that narrative beyond a
subject’s death. More specifically, I will consider how Stephen Jay Gou-
ld’s efforts in the 1970s and 1980s perpetuated and shaped the reputation
of Richard Goldschmidt as a scientific heretic. Reputations, as shared
judgments about some aspect of a person, usually have some basis in the
facts surrounding the person in question. What then is the relationship
between biography as history and reputation as scientific memory?
When biologists decide to commemorate one of their own, they
are actively fashioning a public memory (Abir-Am and Elliot, 1999;
Figure 1. Citations for Richard Goldschmidt’s The Material Basis of Evolution
(1940), 1940–2008. Citation analysis drawn from Web of Science cited source search.
Dotted lines represent author’s inclusion of known sources not included in the Web
of Science database
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Glassberg, 1996). The public goal of this activity is to celebrate the work
of a fellow scientist deemed worthy of such an honor. Among molecular
biologists, Max Delbru¨ck was famously celebrated in this fashion
(Cairns et al., 1966/2007). As historians and biologists have noted, this
festschrift was not neutral, instead it legitimated the place and priority of
the ‘‘informational school’’ in molecular biology (Abir-Am, 1987, 1999;
Creager, 2010). For Abir-Am, these public commemoration are driven
by three kinds of social pretexts: a disciplinary pretext aimed at articu-
lating the public imagery of that discipline, an institutional pretext aimed
at establishing organizational support within a field, and a genealogical
pretext aimed creating a link to a prominent ancestor in order to legit-
imate claims of that ancestor’s descendents to influence and authority
(Abir-Am, 1999, p. 326). The commemoration of Delbru¨ck was driven
by exactly these forms of social pretext by biologists, such as Gunter
Stent, who located himself in a lineage from Delbru¨ck, as he offered an
image of molecular biology as originating from phage research (Abir-
Am, 1985, 1987, 1999). That Delbru¨ck’s origin story was contested by
John Kendrew and others at the time reveals both that biologists them-
selves are often well aware of the social pretexts motivating such com-
memorations and that commemoration within a community is a process
of negotiation (Abir-Am, 1999; Smocovitis, 1999).
Gould’s commemoration of Goldschmidt is a bit odd, because he is
celebrating an anti-hero, not a hero as is more commonly found in
scientists’ historical narratives (Abir-Am, 1982, Sapp, 1990; Cantor,
1996; Smocovitis, 2005, p. 46). ‘‘Hero myths’’ and origin stories are a
well recognized form that typically loosely resemble a biography, but
frequently are directed at legitimating some aspect of contemporary
science (Abir-Am, 1982, 1999). In this sense, they are similar to the
kinds of public myths that Nathanial Comfort uses to describe the
reception of Barbara McClintock (Comfort, 2008), or the ‘‘different
lives’’ that Jan Sapp describes when he analyzes the wide ranging
accounts of Gregor Mendel’s life (Sapp, 1990). Narratives of the sci-
entist-hero often isolate the hero from their non-scientific life, isolate the
hero from collaborators and supporting institutions, and isolate the
hero from their cultural, social, and political contexts. The result is an
individualist and triumphal narrative that supports an image of science
as a privileged and value neutral pursuit (Abir-Am, 1982). Consider the
stories of Gregor Mendel’s long neglect. In these accounts bemoaning
the long gap between Mendel’s work in the 1860s and his rediscovery in
1900, Mendel is portrayed as ‘‘a creative genius clothed in monastic
virtues pursuing the truth undauntedly on the frontiers of knowledge,
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unappreciated by his colleagues’’ (Sapp, 1990, p. 140). Of course,
Mendel as lone genius is eventually vindicated, and in the process, sci-
ence itself as a just and fair enterprise is vindicated. Casting the heroic
Mendel as the founder of genetics portrays the field as just and free from
corrupting influences both from without and from within.
Anti-hero narratives are much rarer in scientists’ repertoires of sto-
ries, but, when they are told, they too are laced with moral overtones
and motivated by social pretext. Indeed, narratives casting Goldschmidt
as a heretical anti-hero resonate with neglect narratives as the anti-hero
is pitted against the scientific establishment. In the end though, where
the hero triumphs, the neglect of the anti-hero is justified and the
impersonal and impartial image of science is upheld.
Ironically, Richard Goldschmidt laid the foundations for his own
reputation as a heretic. He cultivated an iconoclastic flair throughout
his career, but misjudged how his colleagues would receive him and his
work after his immigration to Berkeley in 1936. In a new cultural and
institutional context, Goldschmidt’s pronouncements were not appre-
ciated by a much more pragmatic American scientific establishment.
After his death in 1958, his status as a heretic was sustained by his much
longer lived opponents until it was reinvigorated by Stephen Jay Gould,
who explicitly constructed Goldschmidt as an anti-hero. In doing so,
Gould appropriated a public memory within evolutionary biology. That
memory was in dialogue with the biographical details of Goldschmidt’s
life, but selectively constructed the image of a scientific life that sup-
ported Gould’s standing and research more than it did Goldschmidt’s.
This is not to say that a scientific biography should be uncritically
supportive of its subject, or that biographies are not also selective and
culturally embedded, as Janet Browne’s survey of Darwin biographies
so ably demonstrates (Browne, 2010). Rather, the object of this essay is
to illustrate how scientific biography diverges from the perpetuation of a
scientific reputation as a public memory.
Richard Goldschmidt’s ‘‘Heresies’’
Richard Goldschmidt was both controversial and accomplished. This
combination gave even his most iconoclastic hypotheses some credi-
bility. This combination also makes it easier for Goldschmidt to be
reinvented or revived as an unappreciated innovator or a scientific
heretic who may have been on to something. In this section, I will review
Goldschmidt’s scientific career and its reception by his contemporaries,
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before turning to Stephen Jay’s Gould revival of Goldschmidt in the
next section.
Born in 1878, Richard Goldschmidt began his scientific career at the
University of Heidelberg, taking his doctorate under the supervision of
the zoologist Otto Bu¨tschli. As an Assistant in Richard Hertwig’s
laboratory at the University of Munich, he spent years carefully
describing the development of nervous systems in the nematode Ascaris.
While this intricate morphological work earned him praise in the bio-
logical community and a promotion within Hertwig’s lab, his interests
began to shift toward the study of heredity in 1909. Perhaps because
Hertwig’s lab was heavily focused on questions of fertilization or because
of the association of sex chromosomes with Mendelism, Goldschmidt
decided to concentrate on the genetics of sex determination using the
Gypsy moth (Lymantria dispar) as his experimental system. Gypsy moth
females have white wings with dark bands, while males are smaller and
have brown wings. Goldschmidt exploited the fact that when moths from
different regions were mated the offspring can sometimes have interme-
diate sexual forms. He called these sexual intermediates ‘‘intersexes’’
(Dietrich, 2000, 2003; Richmond, 1986).
From the 1910s to 1930s, Goldschmidt developed a program of ge-
netic research based on the controlled mating of gypsy moths that he
had collected from around the world (Goldschmidt, 1911, 1931, 1934).
Where geneticists in the tradition of Thomas Hunt Morgan tended to
focus on distinct traits, such as the presence or absence of color or
bristle numbers on Drosophila, Goldschmidt was interested in the
spectrum of sexual intermediates from male to female that he could
produce in his laboratory. In order to explain the range or variability of
sex in his moths, Goldschmidt turned to the developmental tradition in
which he was trained and articulated theories of gene action that would
contribute to the foundations of developmental and physiological
genetics (Goldschmidt, 1938).
Goldschmidt’s physiological genetics emphasized the dynamics of the
production of gene products, whether they be enzymes, hormones, or
inducing substances. The link between a gene and its phenotype
depended on the quantity of substance produced and the timing of its
production. Goldschmidt believed that timing during development was
especially important and argued for critical periods where threshold
amounts of determining substances were required to produce the phe-
notype in question.
Goldschmidt’s temporal approach to genetic regulation was foun-
dational. For present purposes, it demonstrates his abiding confidence
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that developmental processes must play a central role in the production
of phenotypes. Where transmission genetics narrowed its attention to
situations where genes unambiguously produced phenotypes, often in a
one to one relationship. Goldschmidt valued more complicated expres-
sion patterns for what they might reveal about the underlying develop-
mental mechanics that were so often erased or taken for granted in
transmission genetics.
Goldschmidt conducted his research on sex determination in
Lymantria, as a laboratory director at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for
Biology in Berlin, where he was free from teaching duties and could
devote his full energy to research. Because different geographic varieties
were required to produce intersexes in gypsy moths, Goldschmidt made
three trips to Japan to collect Asian varieties between 1914 and 1934.
Scientifically, these trips provided the basis for one of the first geo-
graphic studies of genetic variation, as Goldschmidt’s collections and
subsequent experiments allowed him to chart strong and weak varieties
of gypsy moths from Korea to Okinawa (Goldschmidt, 1960).
By 1934, Goldschmidt brought his research on gypsy moths and
intersexuality to a close with the publication of a monograph on
Lymantria (Goldschmidt, 1934). Coming 1 year after the purge of
Jewish scientists by the Nazi Nuremburg Codes, Goldschmidt was
preparing to leave Germany. Although he initially believed that Max
Plank could protect him, Goldschmidt was forced to resign in 1935 and
began a Professorship at the University of California, Berkeley in 1936.
During the 1930s, Goldschmidt was laying the intellectual ground-
work for his two most controversial claims: that there was no particu-
late gene and that the evolution of new species occurred suddenly by a
novel genetic mechanism. Goldschmidt was never shy with his opinions.
In Germany he had become known for his passionate defense of his
bold claims and theories (Richmond, 1986). His decision to attack the
gene and the emerging neo-Darwinian synthesis upon arriving in the
United States was probably exacerbated by his change in status from
Director of a prestigious research institute to a Professor at Berkeley
teaching introductory biology to sometimes less than deferential stu-
dents. It is possible that Goldschmidt was trying to restore some of the
renown he had lost when he was forced to leave Germany by creating
controversy. Or it may be, as he himself wrote to an American col-
league, a matter of ‘‘genetic makeup’’, which encouraged him to ‘‘run
ahead of the facts with conclusions’’ and immediately assign new facts
‘‘their place within the whole’’ (Richard Goldschmidt to L. C. Dunn,
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May 27, 1940. L. C. Dunn Papers, American Philosophical Society
Library, Philadelphia, PA.).
The classical gene concept had been articulated beginning in 1915 by
Thomas Hunt Morgan and his group of Drosophila researchers. In a
nutshell, the classical gene concept asserted that the gene was simulta-
neously a discreet unit of structure, function, mutation, and recombi-
nation. As discreet particles, these genes were often represented as beads
on a string, with the resulting chain forming a chromosome (Carlson,
1966). Goldschmidt’s doubts about the classical gene began to crystal-
lize in 1932 after Theodosius Dobzhansky confirmed A. H. Sturtevant’s
1927 arguments for position effects using the Bar Eye mutant in
Drosophila (Goldschmidt, 1944). Position effects were changes in phe-
notype resulting from recombinations in chromosomes that rearranged
the order or position of genes. According to the classical gene concept, a
gene’s neighbors should have no influence on a gene’s function. Position
effects revealed that in fact adjacent genes did have influence. This called
into question the idea that genes had the sharp kinds of boundaries that
Morgan had postulated.
Throughout the 1930s a number of researchers actively investigated
the phenomena of position effect (Dietrich, 2008). From the Soviet
Union, future Noble laureate H. J. Muller and his colleagues carefully
mapped three mutants, yellow, scute, and acheate to the tip of the x
chromosome in Drosophila. By carefully documenting patterns of
chromosomal inversion that rearranged that part of the x chromosome,
Muller and his coworkers demonstrated that scute seem to be extended
over a large area, that rearrangements in many different parts of that
area produced the mutant effect, and that yellow, scute, and acheate
even seemed to overlap with each other (Muller et al., 1935; Raffel and
Muller, 1940). From Goldschmidt’s perspective Muller’s research sug-
gested that mutations were in fact rearrangements, which could occur in
different sizes, from large visible inversions to invisible rearrangements
that would not even alter the newly discovered chromosomal banding
patterns. Moreover, while mutations and breaks may be specifically
located at a point on a chromosome, Goldschmidt argued that Muller’s
results revealed that the location of the gene on the chromosome was
certainly much more extended. Mutation then was not a reliable guide
to the structure and function of a normal gene (Dietrich, 2008).
In his biographical memoir of Goldschmidt, Curt Stern, who had
begun his career as Goldschmidt’s assistant in Germany, remarks that
Goldschmidt’s reception in the birthplace of the gene was certainly
tainted by his announcement in a funereal voice that ‘‘The theory of the
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gene is – dead!’’ (Stern, 1967, p. 83). Goldschmidt’s rejection of the gene
raised the hackles of the Morgan group. Others, such as Muller and
L.C. Dunn, were more sympathetic, but unwilling to accept Goldsch-
midt’s sweeping generalizations that all mutations were rearrangements
or that the gene should be replaced with a hierarchy of genetic units of
structure and function (Dietrich, 2000).
Goldschmidt’s rejection of the gene was a prelude to his rejection of
the gradual evolution of new species. First delivered as the Silliman
Lectures at Yale University in 1939, Goldschmidt’s The Material Basis
of Evolution was described by him as the phylogenetic consequences of
his view of the gene (Goldschmidt, 1940). While the connection to his
rejection of the classical gene is unmistakable, in fact Goldschmidt’
treatise drew on years of research in evolutionary biology especially his
earlier work on the geographic distribution of Lymantria. As Golds-
chmidt told L. C. Dunn at the time, The Material Basis of Evolution
would be ‘‘typical Goldschmidt with everything I like about him, and
some others dislike’’ (Richard Goldschmidt to L. C. Dunn, May 27,
1940. L. C. Dunn Papers, American Philosophical Society Library,
Philadelphia, PA).
At the heart of The Material Basis of Evolution is a claim that the
available evidence equally supports two distinct alternatives: the neo-
Darwinian theory recently articulated by Theodosius Dobzhansky in
Genetics and the Origin of Species that speciation is a result of the
gradual accumulation of small genetic variations, and Goldschmidt’s
saltational alternative that postulates different mechanisms for evolu-
tion above and below the species level (Dobzhansky, 1937). Goldsch-
midt’s aim was to layout the saltationist alternative as a challenge. In
doing so he was reviving a tradition of evolutionary thinking that dis-
tinguished microevolution from macroevolution and championing the
claim that neo-Darwinism had only addressed the mechanisms of
microevolution (Goldschmidt, 1940).
The Material Basis of Evolution is a masterful review of the evolu-
tionary literature that is even more impressive when we realize that it
was written in spiral notebooks almost without revision as Goldschmidt
sat in the garden of his Berkeley home recovering from a heart attack.
After reviewing the evidence for microevolution, Goldschmidt argues
for two possible distinct mechanisms of macroevolution: systemic
mutations and developmental macromutations.
Based on his claim that all mutations were chromosomal rear-
rangements, systemic mutations were hypothesized rearrangements of
chromosomes on a massive scale. These large genetic changes could
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possibly create an original and stable phenotype. This new species-level
phenotype would appear suddenly as the individual rearrangements
became coordinated and produced a set of reactions capable of crossing
their expression thresholds. The genotypic rearrangements underlying
systemic mutations could accumulate over a long period of time, but
their subsequent phenotypic change would appear quickly. Moreover,
the phenotype produced by a systemic mutation would be of a new kind
of trait, instead of a change in some aspect of the same kind of trait.
This ability to create a novel trait made systemic mutations the kinds of
genetic changes capable of creating a new species – it made them distinct
macroevolutionary mechanisms (Dietrich, 2009).
The chief drawback of system mutations was that no one had ever
observed one. Goldschmidt admitted as much, but his goal was to argue
that such a mechanism was possible and had not been ruled out by the
neo-Darwinian approach. To bolster his case for systemic mutation,
Goldschmidt offered an argument by analogy to a second macroevo-
lutionary mechanism based this time on small genetic changes to
developmentally important genes that would then have large phenotypic
effects. These developmental macromutations relied on a more tradi-
tional understanding of the gene and were the mechanism for producing
what Goldschmidt called ‘‘hopeful monsters.’’ In Goldschmidt’s words,
‘‘a single mutational step affecting the right process at the right moment
can accomplish everything, providing that it is able to set in motion the
ever present potentialities of embryonic regulation’’ (Goldschmidt,
1940). Hopeful monsters then represented the integration of evolution,
development, and genetics. Unlike systemic mutations, Goldschmidt
believed he had ample evidence for hopeful monsters in the homeotic
mutations of Drosophila, which are characterized by the appearance or
transformation of body parts. Dramatic homeotic mutants transform-
ing two winged flies into four winged flies, and antennae into legs, had
been documented in Drosophila since 1918. For Goldschmidt, the
homeotic mutant bithorax mirrored the macroevolutionary transfor-
mation of dipterans from four wings to two. A small, single genetic
change then could produce profound morphological differences that, in
Goldschmidt’s words, ‘‘demonstrate that it is possible, and even prob-
able, that macroevolution takes place without accumulation of micro-
mutations under pressure of natural selection’’ (Goldschmidt, 1940,
p. 331).
In retrospect, Goldschmidt described the reaction of Theodosius
Dobzhanksy, Ernst Mayr, and G. G. Simpson, the architects of
the evolutionary synthesis, as savage (Smocovitis, 1996). In his words,
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he ‘‘had struck a hornet’s nest’’ (Goldschmidt, 1960). While reviews of
The Material Basis of Evolution were negative, they were not dismissive.
Important figures such as Dobzhansky and Sewall Wright argued that
Goldschmidt’s challenges had to be taken seriously (Dobzhansky, 1940;
Wright, 1941). Nevertheless, Goldschmidt’s systemic mutations were
quickly rejected. They simply pinned too much on the idea of chro-
mosomal rearrangements on a scale that had never been observed.
Hopeful monsters, however, would gradually find a place in evolu-
tionary biology.
Goldschmidt forcefully advocated for homeotic mutations as exam-
ples of developmental macromutations in a series of papers throughout
the 1940s and 1950s (Goldschmidt, 1945, 1946, 1952a, b; Davis et al.,
2009). Goldschmidt’s evolutionary claims for homeotic mutants met
with some initial resistance from architects of the synthesis. Theodosius
Dobzhanksy, who had earlier done research on the homeotic mutants in
Drosophila, was not convinced that the large phenotypic changes could
be considered fundamental in part because the famous four winged fly
produced by bithorax could not survive in the wild (Dobzhansky, 1941).
Sewall Wright and G. G. Simpson worried that Goldschmidt had
considered the population dynamics necessary for a new mutant to
succeed and spread. In Simpson’s words, ‘‘the appearance of a mutant
individual is not evolution’’ (Simpson, 1944, p. 53). Goldschmidt later
persuaded Wright to consider how large mutations could spread
through a population, and by 1950, Wright included large-effect
mutations as a part of his shifting balance theory of evolution (Wright,
1950; Dietrich, 2000). Goldschmidt eagerly embraced Wright’s model of
the evolution of large-effect mutations (Goldschmidt, 1952a,
pp. 101–103). However, Goldschmidt still seemed wary to invoke the
large number of modifying mutations that Wright invoked to fine tune a
major mutation into a viable and selected trait. According to Golds-
chmidt, these modifiers were not necessary because the regulatory and
integrative processes of development could produce the needed modi-
fication between genotype and phenotype. From Goldschmidt’s per-
spective, ‘‘evolution is not only a statistical genetical problem but also
one of the developmental potentialities of the organism’’ (Goldschmidt,
1952a, p. 103; Dietrich, 2000).
The most far reaching criticism of Goldschmidt’s interpretation of
homeotic mutations as developmental macromutations was articulated
by both Dobzhanksy and Simpson when they claimed that homeotic
mutations were merely mutations of large effect. They did not deny
that homeotic mutations acted in development to produce significant
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phenotypic differences, but they did not accept that these changes result
in new species. Instead, homeotic mutants were assimilated into the neo-
Darwinian synthesis as another means for producing variability.
In his third edition of Genetics and the Origin of Species, for instance,
Dobzhansky argues that the genetic and morphological changes that
homeotic mutations create are subject to the same process of selection
and speciation as any other type of mutant (Dobzhansky, 1951).
Simpson even agreed that Goldschmidt’s model for gene expression ap-
peared to be ‘‘at least a possible physiological mechanism for the pro-
duction of the observed variations’’ (Simpson, 1953, p. 76). However,
Simpson separated this bit of physiological genetics from Goldschmidt’s
further evolutionary interpretations (Davis et al., 2009).
The tempestuous reception of his evolutionary ideas and his persis-
tent defense over the next 15 years helped secure Goldschmidt’s repu-
tation as a controversial figure. Goldschmidt was aware that his views
were not widely accepted and believed that eventually he would be
proven correct. In a letter to Ernst Mayr in 1945, Goldschmidt
described himself as a ‘‘hopeless case’’ because ‘‘instead of following the
crowd I still believe in my impossible ideas.’’ Rather than see the matter
settled by the arguments presented by Mayr, Dobzhansky, and Simp-
son, Goldschmidt continued to look for ways in which new evidence
could support some of his views. Always confident, he wrote, ‘‘I expect
the day to come when I shall hear in my grave somebody saying, ‘‘That
son of a gun Goldschmidt was right after all’’ (R. B. Goldschmidt to
E. Mayr, September 20, 1945, Richard B. Goldschmidt Papers, Ban-
croft Library, University of California, Berkeley). While Goldschmidt
never convinced Mayr of this, his controversial views did not prevent
others from celebrating his accomplishments, electing him to the
National Academy of Science, the Genetics Society of America, which
he declined, and the Presidency of the International Congress of
Genetics. Indeed, at the end of his career, Goldschmidt was celebrated
by his friends and colleagues as a masterful biologist, a magnanimous
mentor, and a courageous innovator (Comments at Goldschmidt
Memorial by Curt Stern and Richard Eakins, n.d., Goldschmidt Family
Private Papers in possession of the author).
Gould’s Revival
Beginning in 1977, Goldschmidt was revived and reinvented by Stephen
Jay Gould. In an article on Goldschmidt’s hopeful monsters, Gould
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claimed that, as ‘‘a Darwinian, I wish to defend Goldschmidt’s postulate
that macroevolution is not simply microevolution extrapolated, and
that major structural transitions can occur rapidly without a smooth
series of intermediate stages…’’ (Gould, 1977, p. 24). These postulates
formed the core of the idea of punctuated equilibrium that Gould and
Niles Eldredge were championing at the time. Indeed, punctuated
equilibrium itself becomes an object of controversy as Gould began to
associate it with Goldschmidt’s views in the late 1970s and early 1980s
(Sepkoski, 2008, 2009). Gould’s writings on Goldschmidt presented him
as a heretic, and that reputation as a heretic forms a useful association
as Gould sought to mark his new views as innovations. In the face of
criticism, Gould refined his relationship to Goldschmidt, but his rein-
vented heretic remained. Gould’s revived Goldschmidt’s memory, but
his recollection was partial and partisan, when contrasted to expecta-
tions we might have of a scientific biography.
Gould’s revival began with his column in Natural History heralding
the return of hopeful monsters (Gould, 1977). Likening Goldschmidt to
George Orwell’s character Emmanuel Goldstein from 1984, Gould at
once offered Goldschmidt as the object of biologists’ ‘‘two minute
hates’’ during the 1960s and a ‘‘famous geneticist’’ who would be
‘‘largely vindicated in the world of evolutionary biology’’ in the decade
to come. In this account, the neo-Darwinian synthesis was presented as
the ‘‘reigning, if insecure, orthodoxy.’’ In Gould’s words, Goldschmidt
‘‘broke sharply with the synthetic theory, however in arguing that new
species arise abruptly by discontinuous variation, or macromutation.’’
These macromutations produced the hopeful monsters that could lead
to new species, to macroevolution. Gould was careful to note that he
does not endorse everything Goldschmidt claimed, after he argues that
‘‘defenders of the synthetic theory made a caricature of Goldschmidt’s
ideas in establishing their whipping boy.’’ Instead, Gould champions
‘‘Goldschmidt’s postulate that macroevolution is not simply micro-
evolution extrapolated, and that major structural transitions can occur
rapidly without a smooth series of intermediate stages.’’ In the
remaining article, Gould discussed the limits of gradualist thinking and
the nature of microevolution, but when he discusses Goldschmidt’s
mechanisms, he mentioned only developmental macromutations, leav-
ing out the systemic mutations at the heart of Goldschmidt’s book. In
particular, Gould focused his attention on small genetic changes in
genes controlling the rate of developmental processes. In Goldschmidt,
Gould found someone he could cast as a like mind; someone who
was enamored with timescales and the relationship between the two
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historical processes of development and evolution. As such, Gould’s
essay shamelessly plugged his 1977 book Ontogeny and Phylogeny and
makes a point of saying so. In setting Goldschmidt against an evolu-
tionary orthodoxy, Gould made his case for pluralism in evolutionary
biology while marking himself as both an innovator and an underdog
pitted against orthodox evolutionary ‘‘dogma’’.
In 1980, Gould joined the ranks of evolutionary biologists who
proclaimed the advent of a new or improved or completed evolutionary
synthesis. These narratives typically take the form of detailing the
shortcomings of the synthesis and then describing how these short-
comings can be overcome by some new theory or field of research. Like
Gould’s account of Goldschmidt against the orthodoxy, these narra-
tives posit an evolutionary orthodoxy to be overcome or reinvented. In
his ‘‘Is a new and general theory of evolution emerging?,’’ Gould coins
the term ‘‘The Goldschmidt Break’’ to mark the shortcomings of the
neo-Darwinian synthesis that sought a unified explanation of evolution
above and below the species level (Gould, 1980; Smocovitis, 1996).
Following Goldschmidt’s advocacy of the bridgeless gap between
micro- and macroevolution, Gould argued that ‘‘there is a discontinuity
in cause and explanation between adaptation in local populations and
speciation; they represent two distinct, though interacting, levels of
evolution.’’ As before, Gould added the caveat that he did not accept all
of Goldschmidt’s arguments about ‘‘the nature of variation.’’ Instead,
Gould wanted Goldschmidt to mark a discontinuity of levels and pre-
sumably mechanisms of evolution. To this end, Gould returned to
Goldschmidt’s mechanisms and explicitly rejected systemic mutations
while championing mutations in regulatory regions, especially those
controlling timing. Regulatory mutation is, in his words, ‘‘a major focus
in the study of heterochrony (effects, often profound, of small changes
in developmental rate upon adult phenotypes); it is also implied in the
emphasis now being placed upon regulatory genes in the genesis of
macroevolutionary change (King and Wilson, 1975) – for regulation is
fundamentally about timing in the complex orchestration of develop-
ment.’’1
At the same time Gould was trying to reinvent evolutionary biology,
he was convincing Yale University Press to reprint Goldschmidt’s
The Material Basis of Evolution with a new preface that Gould would
1 King and Wilson’s earlier paper had also invoked regulatory mutations, but not in
connection to speciation. Instead, King and Wilson use regulatory mutations to explain
a disjunction between the scales and rates of change at the molecular and morphological
levels. See Dietrich, 1998, Gould, 1980, see also Gould, 2002, p. 68.
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contribute. According to Jean Black at Yale University Press, the 1982
edition sold 1,647 copies over roughly a 25 year period (Jean Black,
personal communication, 7/17/2007). Citation analysis for The Material
Basis of Evolution (see Figure 1) reveals a dramatic spike in citations at
the time of this reissuing. Combined with Gould’s popular and scientific
writing, this reissuing of Goldschmidt’s book brought him back into
scientific circulation (Gould, 1981/1994, 1982a, b, c, 1983). However,
despite a more extensive biographical treatment of Goldschmidt by
Gould in his introduction, ‘‘The Uses of Heresy,’’ the Goldschmidt that
was being revived was the controversialist, the evolutionary heretic
(Gould, 1982a).
Gould’s revival of Goldschmidt invited controversy of its own. Russ
Lande, a population geneticist and evolutionary geneticist, defended the
neo-Darwinian perspective against Gould and by extension Goldsch-
midt. Lande and later Lande with Brian Charlesworth and Montgomery
Slatkin presented a much more detailed analysis of the genetic mecha-
nisms and evolutionary dynamics at play in speciation and proposed
developmental macromutations (Lande, 1980; Charlesworth et al.,
1982). In response, Gould began to make his relationship to Goldsch-
midt’s ideas much clearer. ‘‘Punctuated Equilibrium,’’ he claimed, ‘‘is
not a theory of macromutation (Lande, 1980 notwithstanding); it is not
a theory of any genetic process…’’ (Gould, 1982b). Instead, Gould just
retained the ‘‘Goldschmidt Break’’ between microevolution and mac-
roevolution. He was willing to concede the evolutionary dynamics to
Lande and others, but pleaded with geneticists for ‘‘mutual acknowl-
edgment of interests’’ (Gould, 1982b).
In retrospect, Gould’s revival of Goldschmidt is incomplete in two
important ways. First, Gould did not champion all of Goldschmidt’s
evolutionary views. He selectively advocated Goldschmidt’s proposal for
developmental macromutations and the distinction between micro and
macroevolution. Second, Gould typically reduced Goldschmidt’s work
to a single book, The Material Basis of Evolution. This narrow focus
facilitated Gould’s reinvention of Goldschmidt as a heretic. Only brief
mention was given to Goldschmidt’s career and his genetic views were
incorrectly represented (Gould, 1980). Gould’s Goldschmidt, therefore,
lacked the intellectual trajectory that we would expect in a biographical
treatment. But Gould was not acting as a biographer. He was invoking
Goldschmidt’s reputation in a particular controversy to make a set of
claims about the history and structure of the field of evolutionary biol-
ogy. Gould’s intent here was not simply to use Goldschmidt to cast
himself with him against the orthodoxy. While Gould seemed to enjoy
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railing against the establishment, his interest in Goldschmidt went be-
yond self-promotion; Gould was genuinely interested in developmental
timing and the role that changes in timing could play in evolution,
especially macroevolution (Gould, 1977).
Conclusion
When scientists find out that I’m working on Richard Goldschmidt,
they will often ask if I am seeking his vindication. At first, I found this
kind of question perplexing, because I don’t see history as something
capable of vindicating or justifying a scientific research program. A
biography can seek to explain the rise and reception of a research
program by providing careful historical contextualization, but even the
best history will not scientifically justify a theory or hypothesis.2
If you take this question of vindication as one addressing Goldsch-
midt’s reputation, however, the place of history shifts. Can my or any
historical research on Goldschmidt’s life and work serve as a corrective
to accounts such as those proposed by Gould? My account of Golds-
chmidt’s life and reputation is neither objective nor definitive, but it is
significantly different from the account provided by Gould in terms of
the evidence that it considers and the different aspects of Goldschmidt’s
life and work that it can explain. Gould’s reinvention of Goldschmidt as
an evolutionary heretic does not touch on Goldschmidt as a physio-
logical geneticist, sex determination researcher, journal founder, Insti-
tute Director, advisor, mentor, teacher, art collector, spouse, or parent
as a full biography might. Goldschmidt as heretic abstracts away from
these biographical details to a reputation that becomes a shared mem-
ory. Gould is by no means alone in this construction. Remembering
Goldschmidt as a heretic has appeal to both scientists and historians.
I myself am guilty of placing a great deal of emphasis on Goldschmidt’s
evolutionary research and its controversial reception (Dietrich, 1995).
My rationalization was that I wanted to explore the dynamics of sci-
entific controversy, even though I used the label of heretic freely. In
doing so, I may have contributed to the life of a heretical reputation that
I am now seeking to more carefully historicize.
Gould’s promotion of Goldschmidt as evolutionary heretic is not a
condensed biography. It does not follow Goldschmidt’s personal or
2 Pnina Abir-Am insightfully discussed how history is used by molecular biologists as
a form of secondary legitimation, but this use is distinct from the ‘‘primary’’ legitima-
tion I refer to here. Abir-Am, 1987.
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scientific trajectory, tells us little about him as a person, and deliberately
seeks to make use of his ideas in a new scientific context. The issue of
reputation explicitly focuses on assessments by others. Of course,
biographers do not ignore these elements of how a person or their work
were received by the public or within a scientific community. Indeed, in
his biography of Francis Crick, Robert Olby deliberately begins his
narrative with an account of the events surrounding Crick’s winning the
Nobel Prize. The rest of the biography is then written as either prelude
or postlude to this moment of public recognition and personal glory
(Olby, 2009). Goldschmidt’s reception by his peers is likewise absolutely
important to our understanding of his person, his decisions, and his
research. Goldschmidt’s reception has outlived him. The life of a rep-
utation does not end with its subject’s life. Gould’s assessment and use
of Goldschmidt’s work on evolution will tell us nothing about Golds-
chmidt’s character, because he will not react to it. It will not influence
Goldschmidt’s future research, because he will not be doing any.
Gould’s revival of Goldschmidt’s reputation as evolutionary biol-
ogy’s anti-hero is doing a different kind of work from that of a scientific
biography. Where the hero struggles and triumphs, the anti-hero
struggles and fails. The root of that failure though is crucially impor-
tant: it could be the result of a tragic flaw of character or overwhelming
opposition from without. Gould’s narratives of Goldschmidt cast him
as an innovator opposed by an emerging orthodoxy. In offering these
anti-hero narratives, Gould suggests an identification with Goldschmidt
that casts both Goldschmidt and himself as outside the same evolu-
tionary orthodoxy, as scientific innovators, and as unjustly unappreci-
ated. Gould’s narratives provide a way for him to place himself in an
unorthodox tradition of evolutionary biology that marks his own
contributions as original and deserving of recognition. Casting Golds-
chmidt as an unjustly maligned anti-hero is a means of generating
sympathy for him as a historical figure that Gould wishes to extend to
his ideas and to the dynamics of recognition within evolutionary biol-
ogy. Because we empathize with Gould narrative of ostracism and ne-
glect, we become favorable disposed toward offering a ‘‘second chance.’’
Gould’s narrative does not function as ‘‘secondary legitimation,’’
especially since he backed away from the content of Goldschmidt’s
science rather quickly when pressed (Abir-Am, 1987). Indeed, when
Gould arranged for Paleobiology to run a set of reviews of the reissued
edition of The Material Basis of Evolution, Alan Templeton forcefully
made the case that the book should remain unread (Templeton, 1982).
In the wake of such reviews, too close an association with Goldschmidt
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would create secondary delegitimation. Instead, invoking Goldschmidt
borrowed notoriety and drew attention to Gould’s work as boldly
innovative.
Invoking Goldschmidt as heretic is rarely intended to make a his-
torical or biographical claim: it is intended to make an argument that
evolutionary biology is divided into an orthodoxy and a heterodoxy.
Seen in its best light, Gould used Goldschmidt’s heresies to make a plea
for pluralism against a perceived dogmatic orthodoxy. However, as
Gould and other have noted, Goldschmidt’s bad reputation could also
be used as a moral lesson to reinforce the evolutionary orthodoxy.
In either case, conveying Goldschmidt’s reputation to others is not
intended as condensed biography, but as a way of communicating
information about the political terrain of evolutionary biology as well as
where one stands and how one wishes to be considered. Becoming a
purveyor of Goldschmidt’s reputation is more about fashioning a sci-
entific self-image than crafting Goldschmidt’s biographical narrative.
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